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ABSTRACT
Isabelle/SACM is a tool for automated construction of model-based
assurance cases with integrated formal methods, based on the Is-
abelle proof assistant. Assurance cases show how a system is safe to
operate, through a human comprehensible argument demonstrat-
ing that the requirements are satisied, using evidence of various
provenances. They are usually required for certiication of critical
systems, often with evidence that originates from formal methods.
Automating assurance cases increases rigour, and helps with main-
tenance and evolution. In this paper we apply Isabelle/SACM to a
fragment of the assurance case for an autonomous underwater vehi-
cle demonstrator. We encode the metric unit system (SI) in Isabelle,
to allow modelling requirements and state spaces using physical
units. We develop a behavioural model in the graphical RoboChart
state machine language, embed the artifacts into Isabelle/SACM,
and use it to demonstrate satisfaction of the requirements.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deployment of autonomous systems into an open operational envi-
ronment requires a credible argument, underpinned by evidence, for
safety; namely an assurance case [27]. Assurance cases demonstrate
how hazardous behaviour is mitigated through safety requirements
that must be allocated to system components. This often requires
reinement and formalisation of the requirements to allow the use
of formal methods in providing evidence, particularly for higher as-
surance levels. The formal requirements provide an implicit system
model, which can be reined to an explicit model during the system
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design phases, and used as an evidential artifact [23]. This process
is usually performed in the context of an international certiication
standard, such as IEC 61508, ISO 26262, or DO-178C.
During reinement and elaboration, it is important to maintain
traceability to the original high-level requirements. Otherwise ªfor-
malisation gapsº can emerge, where formal models and require-
ments become detached from the original system speciication and
therefore dramatically lose value [5, 19, 21]. In particular, when
a completed system is evaluated for certiication, there must be a
clear explication of why design decisions were made, and how they
contribute towards satisfying the requirements. In summary, formal
models and assurance cases must evolve hand-in-hand [5, 18].
Previously, we have presented Isabelle/SACM [14], an embed-
ding of the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) [38] into
the Isabelle document model [4, 39]. SACM is a unifying standard
for assurance cases to express argumentation, artifact traceability,
and terminology [38]. Our implementation provides a machine-
checked interactive and hyperlinked assurance language that al-
lows the use of multifarious modelling and veriication techniques,
provided by Isabelle, to provide evidential artifacts. Due to its ex-
tensible and modular architecture, Isabelle is an ideal platform for
integrating formal methods [39]. It supports tools for both high
level modelling [12], including concurrent [13], hybrid [11, 31], and
probabilistic systems [40], and also code veriication [20, 37].
At the same time, Isabelle’s automated asynchronous document
processing [39] supports assurance case evolution, whereby changes
to system parameters, models, requirements, and so on, trigger
re-checking of the impacted document sections. This means, for ex-
ample, we can tweak model elements, such as physical dimensions,
and see the efect on any veriication results. Moreover, Isabelle’s
document preparation system can be used to generate a hyperlinked
PDF that is correct-by-construction, and with all artifacts presented
in a human-readable way, possibly for delivery to a regulator [5].
The contribution of this paper is application of Isabelle/SACM to
a novel assurance case for the safety controller of an autonomous
underwater vehicle (AUV). The safety controller, called the ªLast
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Figure 1: Formalised Assurance Cases
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Response Engineº (LRE), acts as a run-time monitor that enforces
operational rules, and can engage collision avoidance. It is currently
being developed by D-RisQ1 under the regime of DO-178C. Our
end goal is a methodology and tool than can be used to support
computer aided certiication for a variety of systems.
Our methodology is shown in Figure 1. We give a formal struc-
ture to the D-RisQ supplied system requirements document (SRD),
starting from terminology deinitions, and then use these terms in
specifying the requirements in marked up natural language, for
which we also extend Isabelle/SACM. We then develop formal data,
architectural, and behavioural models for the AUV controller, and
use Isabelle/SACM to show how each requirement is mapped to a
transition, state, or other model element. Our paper provides evi-
dence that Isabelle can support model-based assurance of critical
systems [5, 14] supported by integrated formal analysis tools.
For the data model, we develop a Z-inspired notation [36] with
state variables and invariants. The AUV is a cyber-physical system,
and so the requirements contain physical quantities, such as its
maximum velocity. Consequently, we develop a novel embedding of
the SI unit system in Isabelle/HOL, to ensure consistent use of units,
and also enable dimension analysis, which allows higher rigour
than if this information was omitted. Moreover, the embedding pro-
vides access to versatile libraries for Multivariate Analysis [22] and
Diferential Equations [25, 26], which can be used to symbolically
and precisely reason about the AUV’s dynamics and geometry.
For modelling the behaviour, we use the RoboChart language [28,
29], which provides block-based architectural and state machine
modelling notations. The core of the language is a formalised subset
of UML state machines. RoboChart makes the approach accessible
to practitioners with little knowledge of formal methods.
RoboChart has a denotational semantics in Hoare’s CSP process
algebra [2, 28], which allows veriication using the FDR reinement
checker2. However, since the LRE model depends on real numbers
and transcendental functions, the state space is uncountable, and
so cannot be directly model checked. Previously, we have also
embedded a formal semantics for state machines into Isabelle [12]
using our mechanisation of Hoare and He’s Unifying Theories of
Programming (UTP) [24] semantic framework, Isabelle/UTP [16].
The use of UTP allows us to give a unifying semantics to the various
formal notations we use for modelling the LRE. We use our state
machine implementation to support traceability in Isabelle/SACM,
as well as formal veriication through theorem proving, which is
symbolic and so overcomes the state explosion problem.
The structure of our paper is as follows. In ğ2 we introduce the
LRE, and key requirements. In ğ3 we introduce Isabelle, and our
SACM implementation. In ğ4, we develop the LRE data model by
mechanising the SI unit system, and then using this to describe
the state space. In ğ5 we model the architecture and behaviour of
the LRE using RoboChart. We show how we can formally verify
the model, and also link the various elements back to the LRE
requirements. Finally, in ğ6 we conclude and highlight related work.
All deinitions and theorems in this paper are mechanised in
Isabelle3. We present them both using screenshots directly from
the tool, and also sometimes mathematically for conciseness.
1D-RisQ Software Systems. http://www.drisq.com/.
2FDR: The CSP Reinement Checker. https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/projects/fdr/index.html
3Supporting materials: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3739235
2 AUV CASE STUDY
The AUV is a portable (< 200 kg) untethered Remotely Operated Ve-
hicle, equipped with a visual mapping system and veriied on-board
autonomy. The aim is to make it capable of conducting light inter-
vention tasks, such as, cathodic protection surveys (oil and gas) and
simple coring (ofshore), with potential to move to more complex
interventions in a later phase, such as valve turning. The project
brings together the UK expertise from: the National Oceanography
Centre and Forth Engineering in Underwater Robotic Development;
ROVCO on subsea operation, sensor development and subsea vision
perception; the University of Manchester in mixed mode underwa-
ter communications; and D-RisQ in Software Veriication.
The National Oceanography Centre engages with regulators
through their ongoing contribution to the Marine Autonomous Sys-
tems regulatory working group to ensure regulatory compliance.
To this end the use of a structured assurance case is vital to commu-
nicate the evidence of safe operation to non-specialists, especially
in the aspect of software controlled autonomous behaviour. In this
paper, we focus on development of formal models and an assur-
ance case for the ªLast Response Engineº (LRE), which provides
run-time safety assurance. We consider the special case of the AUV
navigating within an enclosed pond to perform maintenance tasks.
Architecturally, the LRE sits between the operator and autopilot
components. The operator, which can be a human or the navigation
system, provides instructions to the LRE to support execution of
tasks, such as requesting a particular heading and velocity. The au-
topilot controls the AUV actuators, and takes advice only from the
LRE. The LRE’s job is to avoid hazardous behaviours, such as get-
ting too close to an obstacle, or entering ªobject proximity exclusion
zonesº (OPEZ), and engaging evasive manoeuvres if necessary.
The LRE functions in four modes: Operator Control Mode (OCM),
Main Operating Mode (MOM), High Caution Mode (HCM), and Col-
lision AvoidanceMode (CAM).Whilst in OCM, the LRE is efectively
inactive, and simply passes through control inputs to the autopilot.
MOM is where the LRE takes control for normal behaviour at maxi-
mum speed. HCM is for the situation when the AUV is getting close
to an obstacle, and so the LRE drops the velocity. Finally, CAM is
the mode where a potential collision has been detected, and the
AUV is manoeuvring away from the obstacle. The LRE has several
high-level safety requirements; here we focus on a small subset:
R1 The physical dimensions of the AUV shall be 457mm ×
338mm × 254mm.
R2 When, and only when, in OCM, the LRE shall accept operator
control inputs and send them to the autopilot.
R3 The LRE shall enter OCM: (i) when the AUV powers up; (ii)
at the end of a task; or (iii) when the operator requests.
R4 The LRE shall enter MOM from OCM when the following
conditions hold: (i) the velocity is less than 0.1ms−1; (ii) the
distance to a static obstacle is > 300mm; (iii) the distance to
a dynamic obstacle is greater than 7500mm; (iv) the operator
requests it; and (v) the AUV is not in an OPEZ.
R5 On entering MOM, the LRE shall advise a velocity of 1ms−1.
R6 The LRE shall enter HCM from MOM when either:
(a) the AUV has a horizontal velocity > 0.1ms−1 and is within
StaticObsHorizDist horizontal distance of a static obstacle;
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Figure 2: Assurance Cases in Goal Structuring Notation
(b) the AUV has a vertical velocity > 0.1ms−1 and is within
StaticObsVertDist vertical distance of a static obstacle;
(c) the AUV is within StaticObsDltVertDist of a static obstacle;
(d) the operator requests it.
R7 On entering HCM, the LRE shall advise a velocity of 0.1ms−1.
R8 The LRE shall exit HCM and enter MOM when the AUV is >
StaticObsHorizDist horizontal distance and > StaticObsVert-
Dist vertical distance of a static obstacle.
R9 The LRE shall enter CAM if (i) it is not in OCM and (ii) there
is an obstacle with an unsafe trajectory.
R10 The LRE shall never enter a deadlock state.
These requirements depend on a number of constants, including
StaticObsHorizDist and LREHorizon, and several deined terms. Part
of requirement satisfaction is to disambiguate and formalise each of
these concepts. Consider, for example, that two coordinate systems
are used in the requirements: R4 and R5 refer to the AUV ªvelocityº,
which corresponds to the overall spherical velocity of the AUV,
including its depth component. In contrast, R6 refers to ªhorizontalº
and ªverticalº velocities, which are velocity across the ground, and
the depth velocity. These distinctions are important for the formal-
isation. We also emphasise the heavy use of physical quantities,
such as in R1, which is used in calculation of safety margins.
3 BACKGROUND: ISABELLE AND SACM
Here, we introduce the Isabelle tool [39], and our implementation
of the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) [14, 38].
Isabelle/HOL is a proof assistant for Higher Order Logic (HOL).
It supports the mechanisation of mathematical theories through
a functional speciication language and (semi-)automated proof.
Isabelle is more than a proof assistant though: it has an extensible
architecture with an executable frontend document model and a
modular backend supporting an array of formal analysis tools [39].
For this reason, an analogy can be drawn between Isabelle and IDEs
like Eclipse. Indeed, Isabelle can provide a frontend and veriication
facilities for a variety of program languages [1], such as C [37].
Isabelle documents have outer- and inner-syntax levels. Outer-
syntax consists of a sequence of commands, using predeined key-
words and parsers, that construct and query previously speciied
formal entities. Each command is implemented in the ML-based
backend, which can manipulate a database of axiomatic and dei-
nitional entities. For example, the HOL document model includes
commands like datatype, function, and theorem, that construct,
Figure 3: Assurance Cases in Isabelle/SACM
respectively, algebraic datatypes, recursive functions, and conjec-
tured theorems. New commands can be deined by specifying a
keyword, and developing ML code to parse and process the in-
puts. The top-level command is theory, which opens a new named
theory context, and can import existing theories. Processing of
documents is dynamic, such that edits trigger real-time rechecking
of the changed artifacts and any dependants.
Each command can take as parameters formal terms of the logic,
which are often enclosed in quotation marks (⟨ · · · ⟩), and referred to
as inner-syntax. Inner-syntax has separate parsing, processing, and
type-checking layers, which construct terms that must be certiied
against the axiomatic core. The parser supports unicode characters
and prioritised mixix operator notations. Certiied terms can be
subjected to various analyses, such as decomposition using theo-
rems to support proof. Consider the following example command:
theorem t1: ⟨x + 1 > x⟩
This proposes a thereom, using the outer-syntax command theo-
rem with the assigned name t1. The content is the inner-syntax
term, x + 1 > x, enclosed by ⟨ · · · ⟩. In the backend, Isabelle irst
parses the outer-syntax command, and then moves on to parse the
term. The operators (+) and (>) must all exist in the theory context,
with appropriate syntax deined. Provided this is the case, and the
term type checks, Isabelle will construct a formal term which can
then be subjected to proof and other analysis.
Commands also exist for structured informal content, such as
text ⟨ · · · ⟩, that can be used to intersperse formal entities with com-
mentary mark up. The backend can then render a PDF or HTML pre-
sentation of the theory content. The content of each text command
can also contain hyperlinks to previously deined entities using the
so-called ªantiquotationº notation, @{cmd param}, where cmd is
the antiquotation command, and param is a parameter. Antiquo-
tation commands include const for deined constants, term for
Isabelle terms, thm for theorems, and typ for types. For example,
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if we have proved the theorem t1 we can add the text
text ⟨We make use of @{thm t1} in the theorem below. ⟩
This checks that t1 exists and has been proved, and if so inserts a
hyperlink. If an antiquotation reference is invalid, if for example a
theorem does not exist or is unproven, then Isabelle raises an error
message. We have seen that an Isabelle document also overlays a
directed acyclic graph of such linked entities. For structuring of
documents, there are also commands like section and subsection.
We use the outer-syntax layer to develop an embedding of an
SACM interactive assurance language [14]. A structured assurance
case is typically modelled as a graph of claims, that are decom-
posed into further claims Ð through argumentation strategies and
with reference to deined context and assumptions Ð down to ev-
idential artifacts [27]. For example, claims may exist that each
requirement is satisied, supported by evidence like test reports and
formal analysis. The claims are linked together through inferences
that assert that certain claims follow from others. Evidence and
contextual elements can be presented using SACM artifacts, which
can be used as leaf nodes in an argument. The content of claims
can be natural language, but can also use formally deined terms.
Assurance cases are often presented using a notation like GSN (Goal
Structuring Notation) [27]; a small example is shown in Figure 2.
Isabelle/SACM uses an Isabelle plugin called DOF (Document
Ontology Framework) [3ś5], to develop an ontology for SACM.
DOF provides an enriched version of the text command of the form
text*[x : c, a1 = v2, · · · an = vn] ⟨ · · · ⟩
which creates an instance x of a predeined document class c, and
assigns a value to each of the n attributes in c. DOF also provides a
command doc class c ≜ a1 : t1 · · · an : tn, to create new document
classes with a name and set of attributes. We extend the document
model with classes for the various SACM entities, and commands
for deining instances, such as Claim, Artifact, and Inference.
Moreover, every SACM class has a corresponding antiquotation,
provided by DOF, to support links in the assurance case graph. The
meta-model instances can be used to analyse the assurance case
structure, for example, to check that every claim is supported.
An example assurance case fragment is shown in Figure 3, that
corresponds to the GSN in Figure 2. It has a top-level claim, C1,
claiming that a system is acceptably safe. The means to show this
is that all identiied hazards have been mitigated, which is claim
C2. An inference shows that C1 is supported by C2, by assigning
these as the target (tgt) and source (src), respectively. The identiied
hazards are given by the context element ac1 that uses a predeined
hazard log as context for C2. Claim C3 then is made that one of
the identiied hazards, H1, is mitigated, which is evidenced by a
predeined formal veriication result, FV1, which in this case is a
theorem proved in Isabelle/HOL. Claim C4, asserting that a second
hazard, H2, is mitigated is yet to be developed into an argument,
and so it is marked with the keyword needsSupport.
Figure 4 shows the deinition of several AUV terms and acronyms
in Isabelle/SACM, some of which refer to other terms using antiquo-
tations. EachDeinition command adds a new term into the theory
context. The list of terms can be used to provide a glossary for the
certiication document output. We particularly draw attention to
the deinition of OPEZ, which refers to several Isabelle terms to
Figure 4: Nomenclature in Isabelle/SACM
Figure 5: LRE Requirements in Isabelle/SACM
specify key dimensions, including their SI units, each of which is
parsed and type-checked before being accepted into the document.
Similarly, in Figure 5 we specify two requirements for the LRE in
two subsections. For this, we have created the Requirement com-
mand, that creates an SACM artifact. The irst requirement states
that the LRE shall be developed according to DO-178C, with an ex-
planatory note. The second sets a timing upper bound of 50ms. This
second requirement uses a HOL constant,MAX LRE EXEC TIME,
that carries an SI quantity. The DOF document preparation system
can render each of the terms, requirements, and other artifacts in a
PDF. Requirements are rendered, for example, as follows:
Requirement 2. Execution Time. Themaximum execution
time for the LRE shall be less than 50·milli·second.
with a hyperlink for ªLREº pointing to the location of its deinition.
In the next section we develop the data model for the LRE, which
includes an mechanisation of the SI unit system.
4 DATA MODEL
Here, we describe the AUV data model, including SI unit types, and
state spaces with invariants. The results from this section support
the LRE architectural model, and requirement formalisation.
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4.1 SI Units and Quantities in Isabelle
The International System of Units (SI)4 is a standard for expression
of physical quantities. It deines seven base units ś including meters,
seconds, kilograms, and amperes ś that can be combined to derive
all the quantities required in science and engineering. Typically in a
computer program or systemmodel, quantities are represented only
by a numeric value, such as an integer (int) or real number (real).
However, for specifying a physical system, such as the AUV, it is
important to both represent the units, and use them consistently.
We embed SI units into the Isabelle type system through a type
of the form n[u], where n is a numeric type, such as int, rat, and
real, and u is a unit type. This allows us to enforce consistent use:
for example, x + y and x − y are well-formed only when x and y
have both the same numeric type and unit. However, implementing
the SI unit system at the type level in Isabelle has some challenges;
notably Isabelle lacks dependent types and so units must be types
rather than values. This issue has previously been overcome in a
Haskell SI implementation [32], from which we take inspiration.
Isabelle’s type system supports parametric polymorphism, where
types carry parameters, such as � list, where � can be instantiated
with a type like int. It also supports overloading using the type class
mechanism, where functions and their properties can be polymor-
phic, and instantiated for concrete types. For example, the semigroup
class characterises a polymorphic function · : � → � → � , and
the associativity property x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z. We can then in-
stantiate this with int, using · ≜ +, by proving that + is associative.
Our approach uses the type class mechanism to characterise a
family of types that correspond to unit tags, which have a single-
ton carrier set and exist only for type annotation. Every unit tag
associates to a particular SI unit, which we encode through a data
structure. We therefore encode the SI system at both the value- and
type-level. We begin with datatypes to describe value-level units:
datatype SIBase ≜ Second | Meter | Kilogram | Ampere
| Kelvin | Mole | Candela
type-synonym SIUnit ≜ (SIBase → int)
SIBase enumerates the seven base units. A derived SIUnit is a total
function from SIBase to int, which deines a power for base unit. For
example, ms−1 is encoded with a function that assigns 1 to Meter ,
−1 to Second, and 0 to every other unit. We characterise each of the
base units as the subset of SIBase → int where precisely one domain
element is assigned 1, and so deine seconds,meters, kilograms, ... :
SIUnit for every such case. We deine arithmetic operators for units:
1 ≜ (� b • 0)
u1 · u2 ≜ (� b • u1 (b) + u2 (b)
u−1 ≜ (� b • −u(b))
Here, 1 corresponds to the dimensionless unit, where every base
unit has power 0. The product, u1 · u2 sums up all of the base unit
powers, and the inverse negates all of the powers. Together with the
base units, we can use these operators to algebraically specify any
derived unit, for examplemeters ·seconds−1. Moreover, we can prove
the following theorem demonstrating the algebraic properties:
4SI Brochure, 9th edition. https://www.bipm.org/utils/common/pdf/si-brochure/SI-
Brochure-9.pdf. BIPM, 2019.
Theorem 4.1. (SIUnit, ·) forms an abelian group: · is associative,
commutative, and has identity 1. Moreover, for any u : SIUnit, the
inverse element is u−1, that is u · u−1 = 1.
We also deine division, x/y ≜ x ·y−1, which satisies the usual laws.
With this algebraic structure, we support dimension analysis in
Isabelle; for example, we can provemeter ·second−1 ·second = meter .
From this foundation, we characterise type-level units. Though
we cannot have an algebraic data structure at the type level, we
can efectively declare an isomorphism between a certain set of
types and the value-level SIUnit. We deine a type class, siunit, that
imposes the following constraints on any member type u: (1) its
carrier set has a cardinality of 1 (it is a tag, and its members have
no meaning), and (2) it associates with an element of SIUnit with
the function siunit-of : u → SIUnit. Every type instantiating siunit
therefore corresponds to a value-level unit. We also deine the type
class sibaseunit, that extends siunit and identiies base unit types.
We then deine seven unitary tag types for each base unit, and
instantiate sibaseunit with each of them, such that siunit-of returns
the corresponding value-level unit. We also deine a binary type
constructor, u1 · u2, where u1 and u2 are both members of siunit,
which is type-level product, such that
siunit-of(u1 · u2) = siunit-of(u1) · siunit-of(u2)
Similarly, we deine unary type constructor for inverse u−1. With
these type constructors, we can also construct every unit at the
type-level in Isabelle. However, we cannot easily perform dimen-
sion analysis at the type level since every syntactically distinct
construction is a unique type: for example ms−1s and m are difer-
ent types. There is no type equality in Isabelle, and so we cannot
automatically substitute these values, but must perform coercions,
which is another reason for also having the value-level units.
We can now deine the type for SI quantities:
typedef � [u] ≜ {(x : �, u : SIUnit) | sitype-of(u) = u}
A quantity is parameterised by a numeric type � and a unit type u.
An element is a pair consisting of a factor x, and an SI value-level
unit u that corresponds with the type-level unit u; this how the
value- and type-level units it together. We can deine the arithmetic
operators + and − easily, since they do not change the unit and
so simply apply to the factors. Technically, we can also deine
multiplication, but due to restriction in the type system, it has
the monomorphic type � [u] → � [u] → � [u] and so does not
account for units. However, it is still useful, because it can be applied
when multiplying a dimensionless quantity and a unit. Consider
the following unitary and preix quantities:
second ≜ (1 : � [second])
meter ≜ (1 : � [meter])
kilogram ≜ (1 : � [kilogram])
kilo ≜ (1000 : � [u])
centi ≜ (100 : � [u])
milli ≜ (1/1000 : � [u])
Here, second corresponds to the quantity of 1 second. It is polymor-
phic in its numeric type, but its unit type is ixed to second (note
the diferent namespaces). We also deine SI preixes, including
milli and kilo. These preixes are dimensionless, or more precisely
dimension-polymorphic, since they can possess any unit. Then,
using the monomorphic multiplication operator we can construct
quantities like 50·milli·second, as demonstrated in Figure 5. Both
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Figure 6: AUV Input Parameters Data Model
the numeral 50 and preix milli are dimension polymorphic, but
second causes the whole expression to have unit type second.
For the general case of quantities with speciic units, we deine
specialised arithmetic operators that account for units:
qmult : � [u1] → � [u2] → � [u1 · u2]
qsq : � [u] → � [u2]
qinv : � [u] → � [u−1]
qsqrt : real [u2] → real [u]
Function qmult multiplies together two quantities, which composes
the two units at the type level, and qinv takes the inverse. The efect
on the underlying factors is the same as the usual operators. We de-
ine square root, qsqrt since this is needed for calculating distances.
Square root can only be deined precisely for real numbers, and
so the numeric type is ixed. It can only be applied when the unit
has the correct form, such as m2. We give these four functions the
usual syntax: x · y, x2, x−1, and √x, respectively. They are used for
the distance and velocity calculations in the next section.
4.2 LRE State Space
In order to specify the data model of the LRE, we need state spaces
with invariants. Isabelle/HOL does not have a high-level command
for constructing these, and so we implement a Z-like schema com-
mand [36] for state space types with invariants attached:
schema S ≜ x1 : t1 · · · xn : tnwhere P (x1, · · · , xn)
This creates a type S, with n variables, each with an assigned type.
An invariant P constrains the variables in a valid state.
The AUV input parameter data model is described using the
schema shown in Figure 6. The schema uses our SI quantity type to
specify the units for each of the variables. Each variable also has an
explanatory textual comment. The inputs include the current depth
of the AUV, its horizontal velocity in north-south and east-west
components, and the vertical velocity (rate of climb). We model
the velocity in this way, as opposed to using an explicit heading
angle, because it makes calculation of relative velocities for collision
straightforward. We don’t include a global position for the AUV,
as we need only consider relative distances to obstacles for safety
monitoring and collision avoidance. There are also several invari-
ants included in the state schema, which assign permissible ranges
to each of the variables. We also encode a requirement stating that
the LRE’s inputs are described by the variables in the AUV Inp Par
Figure 7: Obstacle Inputs and Sensor Data Model
type. To satisfy this requirement, it is necessary for the AUV to
supply these inputs at the LRE interface, with the given ranges.
For tracking obstacles, we specify a further data schema shown
in Figure 7. It speciies the sensed information about each obstacle
that the AUV is aware of, including the relative distance in north-
south and east-west components, and the velocities. As for the LRE
input parameters, we also encode a requirement that the AUV can
supply this obstacle information to the AUV ś efectively we are
assuming adequate sensing capabilities. From this schema, we can
describe a useful function for distinguishing static obstacles:
Deinition 4.2 (Static Obstacles).
is static(ob :Obstacle) ≜ (ob:obs ns vel = 0 ∧ ob:obs ew vel = 0)
In this context, the syntax x:a means selection of attribute a in x.
An obstacle is static if both of its velocity components are zero.
Finally, the LRE and obstacle sensed inputs are combined in the
type Sensors, which describes the complete set of sensor inputs.
The obstacle register is represented by a partial function (A⇀ B)
from natural number identiiers to obstacles, with a inite domain.
Using the Sensor state type, we deine several derived velocity
quantities for horizontal, vertical, and the overall (spherical) veloc-
ity, which are needed to implement requirement R6, for example.
hvel ≜
√(auv:ns vel2 + auv:ew vel2)
vvel ≜ auv:rate of climb
vel ≜
√(hvel2 + vvel2)
The horizontal velocity combines the north-south and east-west
components using a vector calculation employing square root. In Is-
abelle, the type system ensures correctness of the units: auv:ns vel2
and auv:ew vel2 both have type real [(meter ·second−1)2], and so
they can be added together. Then, taking the square root results in
a value of type real [meter ·second−1], as expected for a velocity. The
vertical velocity is really a synonym for the rate of climb, and so we
declare it as such. The overall spherical velocity, including the ver-
tical component, can again be obtained by a vector calculation. In
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Isabelle/SACM we link each of these variables to the corresponding
term deinition, to allow traceability back to the requirements.
Similarly, we also deine some functions for calculating distances
between the AUV and an obstacle identiied in the register:
hdist (ob :nat) ≜ √
(
obs(ob):ns rel dist2
+obs(ob):ew rel dist2)
)
vdist (ob :nat) ≜ |auv:depth − obs(ob):obs depth|
odist (ob :nat) ≜ √(hdist (ob)2 + vdist (ob)2)
The horizontal distance is, again, obtained by combination of the
components, though with diferent units to the velocities. The verti-
cal distance is the absolute diference between the depth of the AUV
and obstacle. Finally, the overall distance is calculated by combining
the horizontal and vertical distances. We can use the odist function
to formalise the notion of the AUV being in an OPEZ:
Deinition 4.3 (Object Proximity Exclusion Zones).
inOPEZ ≜
( (∃ ob ∈ dom(obs) • odist (ob) ≤ 300·milli·meter)
∨ auv:depth ≤ 300·milli·meter)
)
This formalises the term deinition of OPEZ in Figure 4. The as-
sumption is that the pond walls are registered as static obstacles.
The deinition therefore checks whether there is either an obstacle
within 300mm, or the AUV’s depth is less than 300mm. We use the
functions deined in this section for the behavioural model in ğ5.
5 BEHAVIOURAL MODEL
Here, we model the LRE using RoboChart [28, 29], a formal graphi-
cal modelling language for robotic controllers. It includes both a
block-based architectural notation, and a statechart-like language.
Modelling in RoboChart is supported by the Eclipse-based RoboTool5,
with which we created the diagrams in this section.
A typical RoboChart model (a ªmoduleº ) consists of a robotic
platform ( ), and one or more controllers ( ). The robotic platform
acts as an abstraction layer for the hardware, and can provide shared
variables, which often represent sampled continuous variables for
sensors and actuators, and events. The platform is controlled by one
or more controllers, which are modelled using the state machine
notation ( ). Each controller has access to variables in the robotic
platform, and can also have its own private variables. Controllers
can also communicate with one another, and the robotic platform,
using events that allow the communication of commands and data.
Shared variables and events can be grouped together in inter-
faces which can be provided ( ), required ( ), or deined ( ). For
example, a controller may require shared variables provided by the
robotic platform. Deined interfaces are usually used to assign a set
of events to a controller or state machine. In this work, we model
interfaces using data schemas, like those deined in ğ4.
5.1 AUV Architecture
The overall AUV architecture in Figure 8 uses the RoboChart block
notation in the module AUV Module. The LRE is modelled us-
ing the controller LRE Ctrl. It uses inputs both from the physical
sensors of the AUV, and also digital operator inputs.
5https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/robostar/robotool/
Figure 8: Overall Architecture of the AUV and LRE
The physical inputs are modelled as shared variables in the
robotic platform AUV Platform, through two provided interfaces:
Sensors and Actuators. The former corresponds to the state space
speciied in Figure 7, and the latter is unused, as only the autopilot
control the actuators, so its deinition is elided for now.
The digital inputs are modelled using RoboChart events, that are
represented by the squares on the controller borders. Events consist
of a name and an optional list of typed parameters, to specify any
data the event may carry. They are analogous to channels in the
CSP process algebra [2], which is also used to give a semantics to
RoboChart [28]. Events can either be synchronous or asynchronous.
The LRE takes its digital inputs from the controllerAUV Operator,
and gives outputs to the controller AUV Autopilot. The LRE does
not directly control the actuators, but rather communicates advice
to the autopilot, which in turns controls the actuators. There are six
event inputs, which are collected in the deined interface Inputs:
• reqVel, with which the operator can request a new velocity;
• reqHdng, to request a new heading;
• reqOCM, reqMOM, and reqHCM, with which the operator
can request a particular mode;
• endTask, with which the operator can delineate a task.
The two output events are advVel and advHdng, with which the
LRE can sends instructions to change velocity or heading to the
autopilot, which are collected in the deined interface Outputs.
5.2 LRE Controller
The state space of the LRE controller is speciied in Figure 9. In
addition to the sensor variables, which are included by extending
Sensors, the state space includes variables to track the closest dy-
namic and static obstacles. For simplicity in the model, we assume
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Figure 9: LRE state space
that it is suicient to consider only the closest obstacles in decision
making, though this can be generalised. The speciied invariants
ensure that the closest obstacles are both in the obstacle register,
and that the static obstacle is indeed static (see Deinition 4.2).
The assumption of our model is that in each behavioural cycle,
the LRE will calculate the closest obstacles, and for a dynamic
obstacle will calculate the time at which it will reach its closest
point of approach (CPA). From this information, the LRE will be
able to determine whether it is currently on an unsafe trajectory,
and apply evasive manoeuvres. Moreover, the LRE will also use
the obstacle information to determine whether it needs to switch
into high caution mode (HCM). We irst specify the operations for
calculating the closest static and dynamic obstacles below:
Deinition 5.1 (Closest Obstacle Calculation Operations).
sobs ≜ {obs ∈ dom(obs) | is static(obs)}
dobs ≜ dom(obs) \ sobs
CalcCStc ≜ cstc:

sobs ≠ ∅,
cstc ∈ sobs ∧( ∀ x ∈ sobs •
odist (x) ≥ odist (cstc))
) 
CalcCDyn ≜ cdyn:

dobs ≠ ∅,
cdyn ∈ dobs ∧( ∀ x ∈ dobs •
odist (x) ≥ odist (cdyn))
) 
Weirst deine the sets of static and dynamic obstacles in the register:
sobs and dobs. We specify the two operations for calculating static
and dynamic obstacles using Morgan’s speciication statement op-
erator [30]. It has the form a:[pre, post], with a variable frame (a):
the set of variables permitted to change, precondition (pre), and a
postcondition (post). They are both in theory non-deterministic as
there could be several obstacles that are close by. Both operations
have a similar form: they select a static or dynamic obstacle, so
that this is the closest such obstacle in the register. We have auto-
matically proved, using Isabelle/UTP, that both of these operations
preserve the state invariants of LRE State, that is
Σ:[LRE State, LRE State] ⊑ CalcCStc,CalcCDyn
where ⊑ means ªis reined byº, and Σ is the set of all variables.
Once the closest obstacles have been determined, the next step
is to work out whether the current trajectory of the AUV, with
respect to the closest dynamic obstacle, is safe. For this, we need to
calculate the closest distance of approach (CDA), which is minimum
separation that the obstacle and AUV will have if they both remain
on their current course. If the CDA is too low, it means a collision
could occur, and therefore the AUV needs to enact collision avoid-
ance. To determine the CPA, we need (1) functions to calculate the
relative distance at time t, and (2) calculate the time at closest point
of approach (TCPA). We irst deine relative velocity and distance:
Deinition 5.2 (Relative Velocity and Distance).
ns rvel ≜ obs(cdyn):obs ns vel − auv:ns vel
ew rvel ≜ obs(cdyn):obs ew vel − auv:ew vel
ns rdist(t) ≜ obs(cdyn):ns rel dist + ns rvel·t
ew rdist(t) ≜ obs(cdyn):ew rel dist + ew rvel·t
Functions ns rvel and ew rvel calculate the relative velocity be-
tween the AUV and the obstacle. Using these, and the relative
position of the obstacle, we can determine whether the obstacle is
approaching or retreating from theAUV. For example, if the obstacle
is 5m due north of the AUV, the AUV has a velocity of 1ms−1 north
(ns vel = 1), and the obstacle has a velocity of 0.5ms−1 due south
(ns vel = −0.5), then the relative velocity is (−0.5) − 1 = −1.5ms−1
(south) and so the obstacle is approaching from the north.
Functions ns rdist(t) and ew rdist(t) calculate the relative dis-
tance from the obstacle at time t. The deinitions simply subtract
the velocity component mulitplied by t from the current distance
component. Continuing the example above, we have ns rdist(t) =
5 − 1.5·t, so the AUV and the obstacle will be on top of each other
at t = 3.34 s. We can now give the formula for the TCPA:
Deinition 5.3 (Timed to Closest Point of Approach).
TCPA ≜
( −obs(cdyn):ew rel dist · ew rel vel+
−obs(cdyn):ns rel dist · ns rel vel
)
ew rel dist2 + ns rel vel2
CDA ≜
√(ns rdist(TCPA)2 + ew rdist(TCPA)2)
This formula obtains the t that gives the minimal combined dis-
tance from the two distance components. In the example above,
the east-west component is zero, and so we have TCPA = −(5 ·
−1.5)/(−1.5)2 = 3.5/2.25 = 3.34, as expected. Finally, we can ob-
tain the CDA by simply plugging the TCPA into the two relative
distance formulas, and calculate the overall distance.
With these functions, we model the LRE’s behaviour in the
RoboChart state machine shown in Figure 10. Its goal is to imple-
ment the requirements in Section 2. The transitions use an action
language with a similar syntax to CSP [2]: a?v receives a value over
channel a and places it into variable v, and b!e sends e over channel
b. The state machine has four states (OCM, MOM, HCM, CAM)
and transitions between them. Each transition is decorated with an
expression with the general form of trigger [condition]/action. The
trigger denotes an event required for execution of the transition,
and the condition is a predicate on the variables. The action is ex-
ecuted if the transition executes, and following the trigger. Each
part of the general transition form can be omitted. For example,
there is a transition from OCM to MOM that has the form
reqMOM
[
vel ≤ 0.1 ∧ odist (cdyn) > 7.5
∧ odist (cstc) > 0.3 ∧ ¬inOPEZ
]
It states that the LRE can move from OCM to MOM when the
trigger event reqMOM is received from the operator, and the set of
conjoined conditions speciied in requirement R4 hold. The state
MOM has an entry action, advVel!1, that is executed when the state
is activated from any transition, and advises the autopilot to set
the velocity to the maximum 1ms−1. The top-most transition from
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Figure 10: State machine for LRE behaviour
Figure 11: LRE state machine in Isabelle
MOM to HCM has no trigger action, and only the condition
[hvel ≥ 0.1 ∧ hdist (cstc) ≤ StaticObsHorizDist]
attached, meaning that it will activate as soon as the sensor val-
ues enter the characterised range. Requirements R2 to R9 can be
straightforwardly implemented in RoboChart using transitions and
entry actions, since they largely deal with mode switching, and
what the LRE can do when in a particular mode.
The LRE initially enters OCM, indicated by the initial junction
( ). Whilst in OCM, the LRE is not directing the AUV, and instead
accepts velocity and heading commands using reqVel and reqHdng,
which are passed on to the autopilot using the corresponding advice
events (cf. R2). Once a suitable trajectory has been selected, the
operator can request MOM, which can be entered provided the AUV
is not close to obstacles (R4). Whilst in MOM, and indeed any other
state, the operator can request control using the reqOCM event (R3).
Control is also handed back when a task ends, triggered by endTask,
at which point the velocity is also set to 0. The LRE moves from
MOM to HCM either when the AUV is close to a static obstacle, or
when the operator requests it (R6). CAM is entered when an unsafe
trajectory is detected using the CDA calculation from Deinition 5.3
(R9). For now, the behaviour in CAM is unspeciied, as the collision
avoidance algorithm is under development. The LRE exits CAM
once it is no longer on an unsafe trajectory, and drops back to OCM
setting the velocity to 0, to await further instructions.
An Isabelle representation is shown in Figure 11. This uses the
command statemachine, which we developed previously [12], and
has been extended and improved for this paper. It provides a textual
language and theorem proving facilities for RoboChart. The LRE
state machine was manually translated from Figure 10, but this
can be automated. The command creates a state machine called
LRE Beh, using the state space deined in Figure 9. We add two
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Figure 12: LRE Requirement Allocation Claims
variables, v and h, that are used to store velocities and headings.
Most variables have physical units, and so expressions must use
these consistently (ğ4.1). We also create the events, with the types as
speciied in Figure 8. We then specify each state, with entry actions
when needed, and specify that OCM is the initial state. Finally,
we specify each transition, with source and target states, and an
identiier. Due to space constraints, we only show 11 transitions.
Underneath, the statemachine command automatically checks
well-formedness of the state machine, and generates a denotational
semantics, assigned to a deinition called action, which targets a
formal modelling language called Circus [33]. Circus combines the
concurrency primitives of CSP, with statemodelling primitives from
Z [36], reinement calculus [30], and Dijkstra’s guarded command
language [10]. We previously mechanised Circus in Isabelle [13, 15],
which allows us to perform various veriications, including check-
ing for deadlock. The semantics depends on previously deined
constants like StaticObsHorizDist. If these are changed, the entire
model is automatically recompiled and rechecked by Isabelle.
Though the LRE has an uncountable state space, due to the pres-
ence of real transcendental manipulations, we can still verify the
model due to the symbolic nature of our veriication technique [15].
Below is a theorem and proof of deadlock freedom:
This states that action, which gives the semantics to LRE Beh, re-
ines a speciication of deadlock freedom, dlockf [12, 15]. As can be
seen, this process is completely automated through several tactics
we have developed for state machine reasoning [12], and can gen-
erally be applied to any state machine. Deadlock freedom means
that LRE Beh never enters a state where no behaviour is possible.
It follows because there is always an enabled event.
Now, using Isabelle/SACM we can link each of the state machine
elements to one of the requirements, which allow traceability for
each behaviour andwould form part of the case for DO-178C compli-
ance. An argument for allocation of three requirements to LRE Beh
is shown in Figure 12. The top-level claim is LRE Reqs, stating
that all of the requirements are implemented in the generated state
machine LRE Beh. There are then three subclaims, LREC1-LREC3,
that provide part of the argument for LRE Reqs. LREC1 states that
requirement R4 is implemented by transition t1. LREC2 states that
requirement R5 is implemented by the entry action of MOM. LREC3
states that R6 is implemented by transitions t4 − t7. Finally, the
inference AUV S1 shows that the three subclaims all provide sup-
port for LRE Reqs. However, not all requirements have yet been
allocated in the argument (although in reality they have), and so the
inference is annoted with the the needsSupport keyword, mean-
ing that the argument is to be completed. In a similar way, we can
link our deadlock freedom theorem to R10.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We applied Isabelle/SACM in mechanising a fragment of a model-
based assurance case for an AUV safety controller. This is supported
by several formal artifacts mechanised in Isabelle, including termi-
nology and requirements, a data model with SI unit support, several
functions and operations, and a high-level behavioural model in
the graphical RoboChart language. All these heterogeneous ar-
tifacts have a unifying semantics in the Isabelle/UTP semantic
framework [16], which also provides veriication support through
Isabelle’s powerful automated reasoning capabilities.
The overarching goal of Isabelle/SACM is to support certiica-
tion of critical systems, by conveying assurance arguments and
veriication results to regulators and other stakeholders. Mecha-
nised support increases conidence through machine-checking and
traceability, and eases the burden of maintaining and evolving an
assurance case. This is of particular importance for autonomous
systems, which must evolve to match an open environment and
changing requirements [18]. Our paper adds weight to the evi-
dence [3, 5, 14, 39] that Isabelle is an ideal platform for assurance
cases, utilising a variety of formal methods, to support certiication.
In related work, Denney et al. [9] have developed a sophisticated
graphical tool for assurance cases, called AdvoCATE, that includes
management of hazards, requirements, arguments, and other ar-
tifacts. This, and Denney’s pioneering work on formal semantics
for assurance cases [7, 8], is a strong inspiration. Wei et al. [38]
have developed an SACM-based tool called ACME, supporting
graphical arguments and integration with model-based engineer-
ing. Rushby [35] proposes an evidential tool bus as for managing
results from several veriication tools, for assurance cases, an idea
that was implemented by Cruanes et al. [6], and shares several
characteristic with Isabelle. Resolute [17] is a tool for automating
assurance case generation from an AADL architectural model that
we are exploring links with. Brucker and Wolf have applied DOF
to a CENELEC 50128 safety case for an odometric case study [5].
In future work, we aim to use Isabelle/SACM as a backend for
tools like AdvoCATE [9], and are currently integrating it with
Eclipse for use with ACME [38] and RoboTool [28]. We will also
further verify the LRE model, in particular its timing requirements
and continuous dynamics, for which we will utilise our Isabelle
implementation of Diferential Dynamic Logic [11, 31, 34]. The
ultimate goal is a automated assurance cases that go from hazard
analysis and safety requirements, right down to executable code.
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